“And Yosef said to them, ‘do not be afraid, for am I in G-d’s place? [Although] you had bad intentions regarding [what you did] to me, G-d intended it to be good, in order to bring about the current situation, to keep a large nation alive” (B’reishis 50:19-20). After Yaakov died, his sons were concerned that Yosef would now avenge the way he was mistreated almost 40 years earlier, when they imprisoned him in a deep pit and then sold him into slavery. Yosef therefore assured them that he had no such intentions, pointing out that everything had worked out in the end, as G-d is ultimately in control. Nevertheless, the brothers’ concern was based on Yosef treating them differently after Yaakov’s death (see Rashi on 50:15); even if he had (while Yaakov was still alive) treated them better than he otherwise would have in his father’s honor, if he really attributed everything that happened to G-d’s master plan, why wouldn’t he treat them like part of his royal family anyway (and not just for his father‘s sake)?
Other Midrashim (e.g. M’gilah 16b; see also B‘reishis Rabbah 100:9) have Yosef telling his brothers that they have no need to be concerned because “if ten candles cannot extinguish one,” referring their attempt to get rid of him, “how could one candle extinguish ten?” His response was not “don’t be concerned because I have no reason to try to ‘extinguish’ you,” but that he couldn’t even if he tried. Since the brothers message to Yosef, said to be from their father, was a request for forgiveness for what they had done to him (50:17), any response other than “I forgive you” or “I have already forgiven you” indicates that he hadn’t. Therefore, by saying that he cannot “take G-d’s place” to punish them for what they had done (as that’s G-d’s job, not his), Yosef was also saying that all was not forgiven. [Rabbeinu Bachye (50:17) says that because Yosef never forgave his brothers, they had to be reincarnated as the “Ten Martyrs” to be cleansed from their sin, something we lament on Tisha B’Av and Yom Kippur.]
In Yosef’s situation, he was able to see how well things worked out in the end (which was the next part of his statement to his brothers), making it easier to accept what had happened. In most circumstances it’s not easy to just accept difficulties as being part of G-d’s plan — and therefore ultimately for the good — rather than blaming those who seem to have contributed to, or caused, those difficulties. If G-d is just, everything that happens must be deserved (at least on some level), yet we are held responsible if we cause harm to others — harm that they must have ultimately deserved anyway. How do we balance taking — and assigning — responsibility for actions that cause harm with G-d’s attribute of absolute justice?
Rashi (D’varim 22:8) deals with this issue (to some extent) regarding building a fence around a roof to prevent accidental falls, even though the person who would fall if there was no fence must have been worthy of falling anyway, telling us that what happens to a victim is separate from the responsibility we have to try to prevent accidents from happening. But how does that work?
Rabbeinu Bachye (B’reishis 18:19), based on the Ramban, explains how G-d runs the world: “[G-d’s] supervision over the lower world regarding the species of man is both general and specific, [whereas] for other living creatures it is [only] general, not specific, except in order to maintain the species. And the specific (read: individualized) supervision regarding the species of man is divided into two categories: supervision of him (meaning each individual) by being aware of every detail of his actions and thoughts, and supervision of him by protecting him and saving him from happenstances (a term we will define shortly). The supervision of him by being aware of all of his actions applies to every person, Jewish or not. The supervision of him by saving him from happenstances does not apply to every person, even among the Jewish people; only the righteous among them, as G-d saves the righteous from the happenstances that everyone else is subjected to.” [Since G-d’s knowledge is absolute, the implication that He is not aware of the specific actions of animals may seem problematic. However, since animals do not have free will, every action/reaction they do/have is already built into the system, so there is nothing specific to have to be aware of that G-d wasn’t already aware of; anything that “changes” based on the choices people make is included in His knowledge of every person’s actions.]
There are several points that need to be made regarding Rabbeinu Bachye’s thoughts. First of all, his approach is the dominant one among the traditional commentators (even if that’s not how things are often presented). Secondly, since G-d knows what everyone does (and thinks), and based on that knowledge He determines who is considered “righteous” (and therefore worthy of individualized supervision), the terms “general supervision” and “specific supervision” can be misleading. After all, whether an individual is subject to happenstance or not is decided on a case by case basis; even those individuals left unprotected are only left unprotected after it has been determined that they are not worthy of divine protection. As the Meiri (Soteh 2a) puts it, being left unprotected is a punishment for not being worthy enough to deserve protection. The specific outcome may not be the result of a divine decree directed at that individual, but the fact that this individual is now susceptible to the outcome of the situation is the result of a specific determination about that specific individual.
As far as what “happenstance” (“mikre”) is, a precise definition would be an outcome that was not specifically (or primarily) the purpose of the factors that brought it about. For example, if I see a bug on the ground and purposely step on it, that step was specifically intended to kill the bug. If I am purposely walking on a specific sidewalk to get from one place to another, and one of my steps “happens” to land on a bug, that bug may be just as dead as the one I purposely killed, and my steps in both cases may have had a specific purpose, but the death of the second bug is the result of “happenstance,” while the first is not. The factors that contribute to happenstance include: (1) the laws of nature (each of which has a specific purpose, even if that purpose did not include every consequence of that natural law; see http://rabbidmk.wordpress.com/2014/03/13/purim-5774/ for more), (2) man’s free will (even if an outcome was the specific intent of a specific choice made by a person, the fact that G-d gave us the ability to make choices that can impact others was not specifically intended to bring about that specific outcome), and (3) divine decrees that also impact those whom the decree was not directed at (such as the non-wicked inhabitants of a wicked city that G-d punishes, see Rambam, Hilchos T’shuva 3:2). The cumulative outcome of these factors create circumstances whereby people are affected, even though a specific outcome may not have been the specific intent of any of those factors. All of those factors come from G-d (in the case of free will, it is our ability to choose that comes directly from Him, not the choices we make), and whether we are protected from what those factors may bring is determined by G-d for each person individually, but if the specific outcome wasn’t the specific (or primary) purpose of what caused it, it qualifies as “happenstance.”
If something bad happens to a person, there are dual causes that brought it about/allowed it to happen, one based on how the bad thing came about and the other based on who it happened to. If something was a direct punishment from G-d, the two causes coincide, as the sin caused G-d to punish the sinner, and the sin caused the sinner to be punished. If it was the result of happenstance, though, what brought it about is initially disconnected from the person affected by it; one set of factors caused it to happen, while another factor (the person affected not being worthy of divine protection) allowed it to happen. However, we cannot always control (and are never fully in control) of the factors that can adversely affect us, while we are always in control of whether we can become worthy of divine protection. Therefore, even though it may be true that had some of the factors that brought something about been handled more appropriately (e.g. had the homeowner built a fence around his roof) the unfortunate outcome could have been avoided, it is also true that had the person adversely affected been worthy of divine protection, the outcome would have been avoided as well.
Yosef was certainly worthy of divine protection (and received it, regarding the merchandise the caravan that brought him to Egypt was carrying — see Rashi on 37:25; when he was a slave — see 39:2; when he was in prison — see 39:21 and 39:23; and when he was summoned by Pharaoh — see 41:38-39), but his brothers didn’t think he was (see Or Hachayim on 37:21, although his notion that even those worthy of divine protection can be adversely affected by the free will of others is far from universally accepted). After Yaakov died, when the brothers were concerned that Yosef would punish them for what they had done to him, his response was very straightforward. First, regarding their role in his being sold as a slave, he pointed out that it is not his job to deal with their poor choices, (since those choices can no longer cause any harm; obviously if something can be done to prevent any further harm to anyone, it must be done); it is G-d’s jurisdiction. Regarding his own role in the outcome being allowed to happen (i.e. his being sold as a slave), normally the optimal reaction is to accept responsibility for either deserving the direct punishment or for deserving to be subject to the outcome of happenstances (and to then correct that). In Yosef’s case, he went a step further, telling his brothers that, from his perspective, there was no bad outcome, as even though “you intended to do bad to me, G-d intended it to be good.”
