“And the entire congregation shall stone him” (Vayikra 24:14). Since it is a logistical impossibility to have “the entire congregation” participate in the stoning of the sinner convicted of committing a capital offense (not to mention how extremely dangerous having hundreds of thousands of people throwing stones simultaneously would be), and it is inconsistent with the prescribed procedure of having the witnesses do the stoning — with others (who are not described as “the congregation”) only getting involved if the witnesses were unable to complete the mission (see D’varim 17:7), the Midrash (Toras Kohanim, see also Sifre towards the end of Parashas Sh’lach) tells us that the Torah does not mean that everyone must (or should) participate in the stoning. Rather, the intent of the verse is that the stoning should take place “with an assembly of the entire congregation.”

Having everyone present at the stoning presents problems as well. For one thing, what happens if not everyone can make it? Must the stoning be postponed until everyone gets there? [Although there are numerous procedural obligations put into the Jewish judicial system to prevent, or at least greatly minimize, the possibility of capital punishment actually being carried out, there is no indication that requiring every single individual to be there for an execution is one of those obstacles.] The requirement to have “the entire congregation” present applied not only to the specific case of the desert blasphemer under discussion, but to anyone convicted of blasphemy throughout the generations (see Vayikra 24:16). Even if the execution was scheduled in Yerushalayim at a major holiday, when every adult male was required to make a trip to the Temple (putting aside how it might affect the holiday spirit), the Torah is well aware that not everyone would be able to make the trip (see Bamidbar 9:10); how could every member of the “congregation” be required to witness every execution if people lived so far apart? [The space required to have everyone witness the stoning would also seem to preclude everyone literally being there.]

Although not explicitly addressing these issues, Malbim says that the term “congregation” refers to the Sanhedrin (Jewish Supreme Court). Requiring the 71 judges who make up the Sanhedrin to be present at every execution alleviates most (if not all) of these issues. If this were the requirement, though, it would mean that either all executions took place in Yerushalayim (where the Sanhedrin was based) or that they had to be summoned to any city where an execution was scheduled. (I don’t know of any indication that either is the case.) Additionally, Toras Kohanim explains the part of the verse that says “all who heard [the blasphemy]” to mean that the judges also put their hands on the blasphemer’s head, not just the witnesses (since the judges heard the blasphemy too, when it was repeated during the court proceedings). If the judges already had to be there for this preliminary step of the execution, why must their presence be mentioned again just a few words later? Even if the “judges” were not the Sanhedrin (but a court of 23), with these words teaching us that the Sanhedrin must be present too, why isn’t it pointed out “the congregation” refers to the Sanhedrin? Do we only need to be taught that the verse doesn’t mean that “the entire congregation” literally stones the blasphemer, only that they must be present, without needing to be taught who this “congregation” is?

Rashi (on our verse) quotes Toras Kohanim, but adds a few words of his own: “from here [we learn] that a person’s representative (“sh’liach”) is like him,” i.e. it is as if the person who appointed the representative did the action himself. This addition raises several additional issues. The most obvious one is that the two thoughts seem contradictory; if everyone must literally be present at the execution, what need is there to have a representative? Representing who? Aren’t they already there? Because of this issue, B’er Heitiv (Ho’il Moshe) suggests that there must be a mistake in how Rashi’s words were transmitted; instead of saying “from here [we learn],” he substitutes “another approach would be.” In other words, Rashi is providing two possible ways to understand the verse; either it means that everyone must be present, or that everyone must participate in the stoning, which is accomplished by having some do it on behalf of everyone else. Although suggesting such a way around the problem indicates how severe the problem is, there is no indication that this is what Rashi’s words originally were. Besides, the second approach has issues too (aside from those raised above about having an official requirement for everyone to participate). If there is a requirement to participate in the stoning (or to be present at the stoning, for that matter), how can someone else “fill in”? It would seem to be a “mitzvah she’b’gufo,” which must be performed with one’s own body and cannot be fulfilled by anyone else. Just as one person can’t put on “t’filin” on behalf of another person, throwing a stone (or seeing the stoning) should not be able to fulfill another person’s obligation to throw a stone (or see the stoning). There’s an additional problematic aspect here too, as it is possible to fulfill the requirement of wearing “t’filin,” take them off, and then put them back on again for someone else (even though it won’t work since each person has to wear “t’filin”). But if everyone is really required to throw a stone (or see the stoning), when one does so, it has to count towards that person’s own obligation; how can it counts towards another person’s obligation too? (Doing the “sh’chita” of the Korbon Pesach is different, as there is the possibility of bringing a separate offering; here there is but one stoning.) Are we supposed to keep track of how many people we are representing and throw that many stones?

Another issue raised by some of the commentators (e.g. Nachalas Yaakov) is that the Talmud (Kidushin 41a-b) struggles to find a source for the notion that an action done by a representative is attributed to the person who appointed the representative, yet our verse isn’t referenced. If, as Rashi’s words indicate, “we learn [from here]” that it works, why doesn’t the Talmud mention it? For this reason, some take out the word that means “from here we learn,” with the latter words in Rashi being an explanation of the first words. Aside from this not addressing any of our earlier issues, making it less explicit that our verse is an instance where appointing a representative works does not alleviate the problem of the Talmud not referencing it when trying to find a source for the concept.

All of these issues are predicated on the notion that when the Midrashim (and Rashi) say that the stoning must take place “with an assembly of the entire congregation” it means that they must literally be there. The word I translated here as “assembly” (“ma’amad”) is translated by ArtScroll as “convocation” (a synonym), and by the publishers of the old blue linear Chumash/Rashi that was in my parents’ and grandparents’ home as “in the presence of.” Although most of the mainstream commentators on Rashi (e.g. Mizrachi and Gur Aryeh) do not discuss this Rashi at all (indicating that they had no issues with it), those who do seem to understand the word “b’ma’amad” in the same way. I would suggest, however, that this is not what the Midrashim (or Rashi) really meant. Instead, I would translate the word “b’ma’amad” to be “as representatives of,” similar to the way there were representatives from each of the Tribes for the public offerings in the Temple, representatives known as… (wait for it) “ma’amados” (see Rashi on Bamidbar 28:2).

[When the Talmud (M’gilla 26a) discusses selling things that are holy, a differentiation is made between when the sale is made “b’ma’amad anshei ha’ir” and when it is not. Rashi doesn’t translate those words as “in the presence of the men of the city,” but as “with the permission of the men of the city.” Even if the context of the word sometimes means that people are physically there (such as “ma’amad Har Sinai”), and the word itself literally means “stand,” the context sometimes indicates that it is a euphemism for “on behalf of.” This seems to be the case when the Midrashim (and Rashi) explain our verse.] When Rashi explains what the “Men of the Ma’amad” were (Yuma 37b), he says that they were those “who stood as representatives of the public for the offerings.” Here too, then, Rashi means that there are men appointed to represent the entire community at an execution. Not that everyone is required to participate in the stoning or even that everyone is required to be there for it, but that everyone must be represented there, similar to the way there are representatives of the nation by the Temple offerings.

As previously indicated, the type of representation being discussed here is not the same as the representation the Talmud in Kidushim is trying to find a source for, so our verse is not referenced. Panim Yafos says so explicitly (baruch she’kivanti), explaining that the Talmud is trying to find a source for the ability of one person to be the representative of another, as an individual. When it comes to a communal obligation, such as Temple offerings or the need for the community to be present at an execution, individuals can be appointed to represent the entire community. Since this is the situation in our verse, Rashi quotes Toras Kohanim, which explains that the words “the entire congregation shall stone him” doesn’t mean that every individual will literally stone him, but that those who do (whether it is the witnesses or, failing that, the others who are there) are doing so on behalf of the entire congregation. After establishing that they represent the entire congregation when fulfilling the communal obligation, Rashi adds that “from here we learn that (regarding communal obligations) an action done by representatives are attributed to the community that appointed them,” borrowing the language employed by the Talmud regarding those who represent an individual.