“One who curses the name of G-d shall be put to death; the entire congregation shall stone him. Whether a stranger or a native, when he curses [G-d’s] name he shall die.” This law (Vayikra 24:16) was taught to Moshe after a member of the Children of Israel blasphemed (24:11), clarifying what should be done to him. This was the only law that needed clarification, yet a whole series of laws was taught to Moshe along with it, laws that had already been taught (in Parashas Mishpatim). Although additional details are learned from the way the laws were taught here, these details could have been included when the laws were taught the first time. Why are civil laws, which seem to have little relevance to the “new” law about the punishment of one who blasphemes, included here?

POSSIBLE CONNECTIONS

Some suggest (see Daas Sofrim) that after being taught that one who blasphemes is put to death, there was a need to reiterate the sanctity of life (including the life of an animal), by teaching (again) that killing another person is a serious offense, punishable by death. However, this wasn’t the only (or, by most accounts, first) case of having to put someone to death in the desert; in Bamidbar (15:32-36) we learn that there was someone who desecrated the Sabbath and was put to death. If the point of teaching these laws was to reiterate the sanctity of life, shouldn’t they have been taught there? (It is possible that since there were many more people involved in the stoning of the blasphemer than in the stoning of the Sabbath violator, the need was greater by the former. Nevertheless, this would make the reiteration directed specifically towards those involved in administering the punishment, not towards everyone made aware of the consequences of blasphemy.) What about the other civil laws taught here? Ibn Ezra says that since the incident of the blasphemer started when two people were fighting, this aspect of civil law was included as well. Chizkuni adds that since coming to blows can lead to manslaughter, these laws are merely an extension of the law against murder.

A-B-C-D-E-F-G-F-E-D-C-B-A

Even within the laws taught here, there is much repetition. Smiting a person is mentioned twice (24:17 and 21), as is smiting an animal (24:18 and 21), that the same laws apply to the stranger and to the native (24:16 and 22) and that the punishment must reflect the damage done (24:19 and 20). Although law details are learned from each aspect of the repetition, an interesting pattern emerges. Modern (frum) scholars often point out examples of this type of pattern in the Torah, referred to as having a chiastic structure. (It is a similar concept to “At-bash,” where the first letter of the Aleph-bais corresponds to the last letter, the second letter corresponds to the second to last letter, etc.) Rabbi Meir Spiegelman (http://www.vbm-torah.org/parsha.64/31emor.htm) shows how this pattern is present in the civil laws taught here. It is a bit difficult to portray in words without demonstrating it graphically (as Kaeren Fish did when he translated Rabbi Spiegelman’s shiur), but imagine the verses written out on ledges protruding from a triangle, with the first verse (or part of it) on the bottom right of the triangle, and its corresponding verse (or verse segment) opposite it on the bottom left. As we go up one level on the triangle, the next part is a bit higher and closer to the center on the right side, while the second to last part is parallel to it on the left side. This pattern continues until we reach the tip; the verse or clause that sits on top, in the center of the section, would be the focal point of the entire section. I will try to recreate this pattern of parallel clauses, designating “0” as the “center,” with corresponding numbers on the right (“a”) and left (“b”) sides of the focal point. The thrust of the section should become apparent once we discover what its focal point is. What follows is an exact quote (my translation) of the section of laws taught to Moshe after he was told what to do to the blasphemer (24:16-22):“The stranger and the native are [treated] the same (6a), if  he curses [G-d’s] name, he shall die (5a). And if someone kills another person, he shall be put to death (4a). And if he kills an animal, he shall pay for it, life for life (3a). And if a person maims another, as he did so shall be done to him (2a). A break for a break (1a), an eye for an eye (0), a tooth for a tooth (1b) as he maimed another, so shall be [done] to him (2b). And one who smites an animal shall pay (3b), and one who smites a person shall die (4b). There shall be one law for (the plural) you (5b), the stranger and the native shall be [treated] the same (6b).”

[I divided it slightly differently than Rabbi Spiegelman did, separating 5/6 into two clauses by comparing the specific law to general law, while he combined them into one clause and added two additional layers. Besides his needing to explain a clause that has no parallel (unless “for I am Hashem your G-d” somehow corresponds to “whomever curses his Superior–or superior–shall bear his iniquity,” which is plausible if not direct), and the summation of “for I am Hashem your G-d” being an appropriate closing, the issue at hand is the section of laws, not the narrative that surrounds it.]

WHAT IS THE MESSAGE?

The “bookends” of this section, that the stranger and the native are treated the same, was an appropriate message for this situation. After all, the blasphemer’s father was an Egyptian; G-d had to make it absolutely clear that this law was not limited to “outsiders,” but applied equally to everyone. As Ramban and S’fornu explain (24:23), “the Children of Israel did as G-d commanded Moshe” teaches us that they did it because G-d commanded it, not because of any grudge held based on lineage that wasn’t as pure as theirs. However, the center clause, “an eye for an eye,” seems to be just part of the civil laws, not a “focal point.” Why are all of these parallel clauses surrounding this thought? How is this the “focus” of the laws taught here, and by extension the purpose of teaching them now?

“AN EYE FOR AN EYE”

In “Recalling the Covenant” (Parashas Mishpatim, pgs. 399-406), Rabbi Moshe Shamah discusses the meaning of this term. He writes (pg. 404), “Hammurabi …introduced the “eye for an eye” concept against the traditional practice of monetary compensation for physical injury. His purpose with this innovation was to improve the legal justice system by removing one of its blatant deficiencies… The system was rife with uneven application, exploitation and abuse. Hammurabi’s reform transformed the infliction of physical damage into an objective violation with governmental guidelines as to definitive, equitable and limited punishment.” Instead of haphazard payment levels, determined on a case-by-case basis based on the status, wealth and negotiating ability of the parties involved, “an eye for an eye” meant that there was one set of standards for everyone, based on an objective determination of the damages rather than on the status of the person who did the damages or the person who was damaged. Even though it was likely never carried out literally, the expression “an eye for an eye” became synonymous with a consistent system of justice, and was understood that way when used in the Torah. It is therefore an appropriate focal point within the set of laws included to make it clear that the punishment given to the blasphemer was not because of his (lack of) status, or of his status compared to the person he was quarreling with, but because it was the objective law, to be applied equally to everyone. Just as the Torah’s civil laws are applied justly and equally, so was this one (and others similar to it that were not “civil laws”).

ON THE EDGE OF HOLINESS

There is some discussion as to why the narrative of the blasphemer (and the laws that became part of it) was included in Sefer Vayikra, which, except for this narrative and that of Nadav and Avihu’s death, is comprised of laws and covenantal commitment, specifically the laws of holiness, ritual purity, and sanctity. There is something that these two episodes have in common (see http://vbm-torah.org/archive/parsha71/31-71emor.htm” for a similar idea). In both situations, individuals attempted to go beyond their appropriate “holiness” boundary. Nadav and Avihu had attained the level/status of a Kohain Gadol (because they were anointed with the anointing oil; this was why Elazar and Isamar couldn’t remove their brothers’ bodies even though “regular” Kohanim can become ritually impure for immediate family, and why they couldn’t leave their Mishkan service), yet suffered severe consequences when they entered the inner sanctum of the Mishkan, where they didn’t belong. The blasphemer wanted to dwell in the Camp of Israel even though his father was an Egyptian, and cursed G-d when he was told that he wasn’t allowed to (see Rashi on 24:10). These two narratives demonstrate how important it is to not to trespass areas of holiness beyond our grasp–whether it’s at the top of the scale, like Nadav and Avihu, or the bottom of the scale, like the blasphemer who couldn’t even get into the main Israelite camp. Yet, when it comes to how they are treated by the law, everyone is treated equally. And in case there was any doubt, G-d reiterated this by including civil laws, which are based on the concept of “an eye for an eye,” when he instructed the nation to put the blasphemer to death.